conceives the division of labor in terms adapted from Darwin's theory of speciation-particularly the idea of differentiation due to densitydependent competition.1 Others since have nursed the idea of human social life. Selznick (1956) , for example, defines the social institution as &dquo;a natural product of social needs and pressures-a responsive, adaptive organism&dquo; (5). Institutional theory, for Selznick, is about natural social processes within formal bureaucracy. &dquo;Taking account of both internal and external social forces,&dquo; he writes, &dquo;institutional studies emphasize the adaptive change and evolution of organization forms and practices&dquo; (12) . The same concern for organism in relation to formal organization appears in Thompson (1967) .
Images of organism appear also in the works of Le Bon and Freud. In crowds of certain kinds, Le Bon (1903) sees not only an organism but an organism having mental unity, a mind. And in the massive and elaborate social forms of the Prussian army and Catholic church, Freud (1922 Freud ( /1959 (55) . &dquo;Individual needs&dquo; refers to the will of group members to satisfy conscious and rational desires; &dquo;group mentality&dquo; refers to the will of the group to act in ways that satisfy members' unconscious wishes, a will generally opposed to the avowed aims of individual members; and &dquo;group culture&dquo; refers to activity orientations and syndromes of feeling that result from conflicts between individual needs and group mentality. Three basic types of group culture vie for expression: flight/fight, pairing, and dependence. In the flight/fight culture, the group acts as if in response to a threatening enemy In the pairing culture, the group acts as if reproduction were its primary concern, and group members form emotional bonds with one another. In the dependence culture, the group acts as if its main aim were to subordinate individual needs to the control of a dominant leader. What makes the group a group, according to Bion, is the constant interplay and elbowing for control of action and emotion elements.3
One of the earliest images of organism in sociology appears in Toennies's (1876 Toennies's ( /1957 ) study of the gemeinschaft. The gemeinschaft, writes Toennies, is perfect unity of individual wills. It is an organism, a unity whose elements are joined in a mutually affirming like-mindedness exclusive of individual identity and self-interest. Toennies conceives this unity to be the natural and original condition of human society, having its basis in kinship, originally of blood and family, but later in ties of geography, race, and nationality. It is signifi-cant of Toennies's analysis that he finds the gemeinschaft to be the only true form of society. This is in contrast to the gesellschaft, which he defines as a collection of individuals and which he diminishes as mere abstraction. &dquo;Everything real,&dquo; he writes, &dquo;is organic in so far as it can be conceived only as something related to the totality of reality and defined in its nature and movements by this totality&dquo; (192) . For Toennies, if only organisms are real, then society is real only insofar as it is an organism.
Distinct images of life appear also in Simmel (1971) , who finds that &dquo;all sociability is but a symbol of life&dquo; (162), particularly &dquo;as it shows itself in the flow of lightly amusing play&dquo; (162) . Interaction becomes a social reality when it is sensibly alive (72). For Simmel, social (Follett 1937; Metcalf and Urwick 1942) and in Giddens' concept of social life as structuration (Giddens 1979) . For Follett (1937, 161) (Kroeber 1952,112) . In sociology, the ascendance of structuralfunctionalism in the 1950s and 1960s altered the image of society from organism to system. When Parsons and Shils (1951) 
TOWARD A METAPHYSICS OF SOCIAL LIFE
We are still living in an age which I think our successors will some day look back upon with curiosity and wonder as an age characterized especially by physical realism-an age strangely blind in some, but by no means all, respects to what will then appear as outstanding spiritual reality, and concealing this behind scientific abstractions which it had taken for representations of reality and proceeded to bow down before, though they were only its own creations. (Haldane 1931,114) From Materialism to Organism According to Whitehead, to understand life it is necessary to go beyond the discredited materialist metaphysics of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century science which conceives nature as spatially isolated bits of matter in motion. This metaphysics, he argued, is meaningless and discloses no ground for the coherence of life. Echoing this view, Sperry (1985) Wilson (1975) , Dawkins (1989) (155) This all-over-the-road imperiousness of language comes at a price, and that price is an inability to symbolize phenomena that cannot be decomposed into objects and predicates. Language compiles experience in a way that makes only certain conceptions possible. Experiences that fit the logical form of language are conceivable, those that do not are distorted or left to remain ineffable. This second category includes all experiences of interaction, vitality, and feeling. By subjecting such phenomena to their object-predicate structure, a structure which makes substances even of nonsubstances, language produces a &dquo;cap of invisibility&dquo; (Langer 1967) , which obscures processes and dynamisms. Arnheim (1966) To conceive the interaction of yin and yang, Amheim argues, there is no choice but to approach the problem perceptually, as, for example, through the well-known visual symbol, the T'ai chi tu (see Figure 1) The dimensions of this problem can be seen in theories of society that must make do with words. Most theories of organization are in the tradition of Parsonian structural-functionalism (Dow 1988 ). This tradition explains organization by dynamics that fit or adapt organizations to environments. It is said either that organizations &dquo;adapt&dquo; to their environments or that their environments &dquo;select&dquo; them out if they are unadapted. As the author and Robert Drazin have elsewhere argued (Sandelands and Drazin 1989) , a problem with these perspectives is that they describe a world that does not bear close scrutiny: They speak of organizing processes that cannot be verified. When we look behind the words, we find nothing so concrete or definite as the words suggest. If it is asked how environments determine organization, the answer usually given is that they &dquo;select&dquo; or &dquo;choose&dquo; one that is appropriate. However, to say that organization is selected or chosen only incorporates the fact to be explained in the verb used to do the explaining. The verbs to select and to choose do not refer to definite activities, but rather to the consequences of unspecified activities. What appears to be a process only seems to explain organization.
Structural-functional theories of organization are undermined by words that do not name experiences. There are problems no less in Giddens' theory of social organization as structuration, which is posed as a radical alternative to structural-functionalism (Giddens 1979 (Langer 1967, 200 (206) .
Presentational symbols, such as works of art, achieve their effects through the modes of perception to which they appeal. For example, the great power of visual symbols arises in the symbolizing capacity of the human visual system. Visual perception is visual thinking (Arnheim 1969 A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold winter's day so as to profit by one another's warmth and so save themselves from being frozen to death. But soon they felt one another's quills, which induced them to separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought them nearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that they were driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to the other, until they had discovered a mean distance at which they could most tolerably exist. (quoted in Freud 1922 Freud /1959 3. The vital images detailed in the work of Freud and Bion were later elaborated by Stock, Thelen, Lieberman, Hare and others of the Human Dynamics Laboratory at the University of Chicago. As summarized by Stock and Thelen (1958) , this work rests upon an image of the human group as a life unto itself&mdash;as an adaptive process. "The word 'group,' " they write, "stands for some organizing principle that enables us to see the behaviors of individuals, not as random, separate events, nor yet as simple stimulusresponses connections, but rather as having a place within a manifold of behaviors that began in the past and can be projected into the future" (9). On the one hand, the group is a definite phenomenon; a vital flow, a manifold of behaviors with a past, present, and future. On the other hand, the group is not a simple "thing" to be seen or touched, but a word for some organizing principle. The group is not an object, but a life.
4. Today, the literal concept of organism survives only at the controversial margins of social science, in the fields of sociobiology and complex adaptive systems. Sociobiology, first outlined by Wilson in 1975 and since fought about more for its moral implications than for its substance, seeks to establish the genetic basis and evolution of animal society, including human society. It argues that certain social behaviors and forms evolve by natural selection (i.e., as genomic adaptations to circumstances). The theory of complex adaptive systems propounded by Holland (1992) (38) .
7. This point is suggested by the development of the science of morphology, particularly as it appears in the pioneering work of Goethe. As Engard (1952) points out in his introduction to his collection of Goethe's botanical writings, Goethe's concept of morphology as an ever-moving process of becoming could arise only with his rejection of the Linnean analytical typology of species which was based upon observations of the fixed and unchanging characteristics of visible life forms.
